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May I Treat A Collective As A Mere Means?  
 
Abstract: According to Kant, it is impermissible to treat humanity as a mere means. If we accept Kant's 
equation of humanity with rational agency, and are literalists about ascriptions of agency to collectives it appears to 
follow that we may not treat collectives as mere means. On most standard accounts of what it is to treat something 
as a means this conclusion seems highly implausible. I conclude that we are faced with a range of options. One 
would be to rethink the equation of humanity with rationality. Another would be to abandon the prohibition on 
treating as a means. The last would be to abandon literalist construals of attribution of agency to collectives.  (113 
words) 
 
I: Introduction 
 
Kant famously argued that it is morally impermissible to treat humanity merely as a 
means to an end.i The formulation of the categorical imperative in which Kant expresses this 
prohibition - the so-called formula of humanity – is widely held to be among the more plausible 
and contentful of the various formulations that Kant provides of the categorical imperative. ii 
Furthermore, although Kant’s prohibition on treating others as a means – labelled the ‘Mere 
Means Principle’ by Samuel Kerstein - may not exhaust the full content of the Kantian duty to 
respect rational nature as an end-in-itself, the Mere Means Principle (henceforth, MMP) has been 
at the basis of many of the most plausible attempts to show how we might derive some 
substantive moral content from the formula of humanity. iii 
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 The interpretation of MMP raises two kinds of problem. One relates to its scope – to the 
question of what we may or may not treat as a means. The second relates to its content: to the 
understanding of what it is to treat something as a mere means. Many, though not all recent 
discussions have concentrated on the second of these questions. By contrast, my main concern 
will be with the first. I shall argue that if we understand the scope of the principle in the way 
which many Kant commentators suggest, Kant is committed to an implausible view about our 
moral relationship to collective agents. He is committed to the view that we may not treat 
collective agents as mere means, even in situations where this would not involve treating any 
individual agent as a mere means.iv 
 
In saying that it is impermissible to treat humanity as a mere means, Kant was not simply 
saying that it was impermissible to treat individual human beings as mere means. For Kant tends 
to use the terms ‘humanity’ and ‘rational nature’ interchangeably.v Furthermore, many (though 
not all) of Kant’s arguments about the specific duties which agents owe to one another are 
grounded simply in considerations about what is required, and what is owed to creatures with a 
capacity for rational agency, where rational agency requires little more than the ability to set 
oneself goals and to pursue them.vi vii 
 
 It is well-known that for Kant, the class of rational agents need not be identical with the 
class of human beings. For this reason, the notion of a person, rather than that of a human 
being, has often been prominent in discussions of Kantian ethics. However, one class of entities 
which many philosophers recognize as agents,viii and which are not identical with individual 
human beings, is rarely discussed in this context: collective agents.ix  
 
Forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly – please cite the published version if it is 
available (there are some small, but non-substantive changes in the final version.) 
3 
 There are a number of practical contexts, including moral, legal and political contexts 
where we do treat collectives as agents in their own right, and where it is at least not obvious 
that we could reconstruct these practices in ways which do not involve literal construals of 
agency without changing them in significant ways. These practices include assigning blame 
(as we might do when we blame the corporate entity Philip Morris, and not merely the 
executives who are part of it responsible for million),x assigning legal responsibility and liability 
for punishment (at least within common-law based legal systems, such as that within the United 
Kingdom and most of the United States),xi and assigning forward looking responsibilities both 
for remedying existing wrongs and for preventing, or at least mitigating future ones.xii 
Furthermore it seems hard to see how someone attracted to Kantian accounts of rationality and 
morality might be able to resist allowing for the possibility of literal ascriptions of agency to 
collectives. For, at least as they are typically understood, Kant's conception of rationality, 
morality, and even agency, are purely formal. Someone attracted to  conceptions of this sort 
seems to be in a poor position to impose a priori   restrictions on the kinds of things that could 
be agents.  xiii  
 
  Does Kant’s prohibition on treating humanity as a mere means apply to agents of this 
sort? If, as Kant seems to think, humanity and rational nature are the same thing, then it is hard 
to see why it should not. If we take Kant’s prohibition seriously, and if we think corporations are 
capable of rational agency it seems as though we are prohibited from treating corporations as 
means to ends.xiv This seems highly implausible – more implausible, for example, than the idea 
that collectives are capable of fully-fledged agency.  
 
  
II: Murder Inc.  
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To see why it is implausible to suppose that there is something problematic about 
treating a collective as a mere means, consider an example of a collective which has been 
discussed in some detail by Claudia Card – that of Murder, Inc.xv Murder Inc. was an organized 
crime syndicate operating in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s which was responsible for 
over 1000 murders while operating a wide variety of systems of racketeering and extortion.xvi  
 
Card argues that the existence of Murder Inc. presents difficulties for any view which 
holds that any organism which has interests or which is capable of flourishing, has at least a prima 
facie claim to respect.xvii For Murder Inc. seems  to satisfying both of these conditions. For 
example, it may have an interest in ensuring the ready availability of guns and ammunition in 
large cities so that it can easily recruit potential hitmen; and it is perhaps a condition of  Murder 
Inc.’s flourishing that law enforcement should be less than minimal, so that less well-organized, 
or less vicious gangs of thugs do not complicate its existence.  
 
 If we are interested in discussing MMP, we need to ask whether Murder Inc. is rational. 
The answer appears to be 'Yes': it is capable of  having ends and taking means towards these 
ends, and indeed of setting itself ends. Thus, for example, the bosses of Murder Inc. might set 
themselves the goal of expanding their operations in California, and might take this decision in 
such a way that it could be recognized as a goal of the organization. If so, then Murder Inc. 
seems to fall under the scope of MMP.    
 
 However, it seems  implausible that there is anything wrong with treating Murder Inc. as 
a mere means.  If the claim that we should not treat Murder Inc as a mere means entails that we 
owe the same kinds of duties  to Murder Inc. as to individual human agents, this  seems clear. 
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Consider an imperfect duty, such as the duty of benevolence. Perhaps Murder Inc, will go out of 
existence if it is no longer able to make good on its debts to its hitmen. Still, I am under no 
obligation to donate money to its ‘Benevolent Fund’. In fact, I am probably under an obligation 
not to.  
 
 On some accounts of collective agency, Murder Inc. might not meet all of the conditions 
for being a fully-fledged collective agent. Thus, for example, despite its name it  is perhaps 
implausible that Murder Inc. had the kind of formally defined ‘corporate decision structure’ 
which Peter French takes to be essential for corporate agency. What is perhaps less implausible is 
that a collective agent with purposes that were in some ways every bit of nefarious as those of 
Murder Inc. should have such a structure. xviii 
 
III: Humanity – Good Will or Rationality? 
 
 I have focused, on an examples of a collective organization which has evil purposes. . 
Many interpreters of Kant hold that it would be implausible, and utterly incompatible with  
Kant’s ethical outlook, to suppose that the fact that an individual human agent had 
predominantly evil purposes excluded them from the scope of MMP.xix If so, and if  all rational 
agents fall under the scope of MMP, then the fact that Murder Inc. has predominantly evil 
purposes excludes it from the scope of  MMP.To do so would, in effect, involve a kind of 
biological chauvinism which is out of keeping with an approach which focuses on  what we owe 
to rational agents.  
  
 Richard  Dean argues that when Kant talks about ‘humanity’, he has something more 
than mere rationality in mind.xx Dean reminds us that Kant holds that the only thing which is 
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good without qualification is the good will, and points out that if we suppose that something can 
only be an end-in-itself if it is good without qualification - something which seems at least 
initially plausible – then it seems hard to avoid concluding that Kant is committed to the view 
that only the good will can be an end-in-itself. xxi  Call this  the ‘Good Will’ interpretation of 
humanity. If correct, it suggests that we are under no obligation to avoid agents who do not have 
a good will as a mere means. In the current context, Dean's view seems appealing. If we are not 
obliged to treat agents who lack a good will as ends-in-themselves, we may be able to avoid being 
commitment to the view that we ought to treat Murder Inc. as an end in itself. 
 
The ‘Good Will’ interpretation is problematic. It seems to suggest that we can tell lies, 
break promises and otherwise manipulate other agents, provided they do not possess a good will. 
As Dean admits, this all seems highly unKantian. He suggests that we can rescue the ‘Good Will’ 
interpretation by appealing to Kant's view that we can’t know very much about the quality of 
another agent’s will. So he suggests that  the reason that on Kant’s view we cannot lie to, break 
promises to, or otherwise manipulate an evil agent is that we can never be sure that we are 
dealing with such an agent.xxii  
 
It is unclear whether this kind of skepticism about other people’s motives is either 
plausible or plausibly Kantian.xxiii Furthermore the purposes of collective agents will often 
depend in significant ways on the purposes of individual agents. If  we cannot be sufficiently sure 
of the purposes of an individual agent to be justified in being confident that they lack a good 
will, it is hard to see how we could be confident that we could correctly judge the quality of the 
will of a collective agent. If so then we cannot make Dean’s account plausible  without 
precluding it from solving the problems raised by Murder Inc.   
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IV: Treating as a Mere Means: Three Interpretations 
   
 I have argued that that the fact that Murder Inc. has predominantly evil purposes should 
not be taken to exempt it from the scope of MMP. However, someone might suggest that this 
fact is, nonetheless, relevant to the content of that Principle: perhaps less is required of us, in 
order to avoid treating Murder Inc. as a means than we might suppose.  In order to address this 
line of thought adequately we shall need to consider in more detail how MMP should be 
interpreted. I shall argue that most common interpretations raise questions about our treatment 
even of collective agents without evil purposes  
  
 On one interpretation of MMP -  the ‘End-Sharing’ account - one agent treats a second 
as a mere means if the first agent’s action involves an end which the second agent could not 
share.xxiv On a slightly different  interpretation - the ‘Possible Consent’ account - an agent treats a 
second agent as a mere means when the first agent has as the maxim of their action something to 
which the second agent could not consent.xxv  
 
 The ‘End-Sharing’ version of the ‘Mere Means’ principle, does not seem to be  a 
plausible moral constraint on our actions with respect to collective entities. Many collective 
entities are formally constrained with regard to the kinds of ends they may have. The University 
Promotions Committee may have as one of its ends that the right kinds of individuals are 
promoted to responsible posts within the university. There are many ends which I might quite 
legitimately have when volunteering to sit on it – for example, that of satisfying my own 
department’s service requirements, which this committee qua committee cannot have.xxvi Under 
some regimes of business law, business corporations are required to maximize shareholder 
profit. If so, they are, by their very constitution, precluded from sharing many of the ends which 
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I might have in seeking employment with them. And whatever ends, a nation may have in 
performing some official act such as issuing me with a passport, it does not seem that my end of 
being able to enjoy a pleasant and restful vacation is or could be one of them.    
 
 Someone might suppose that these limitations on the ends collective bodies can have are 
simply contingent limitations, akin to psychological limitations that individuals might be subject. 
So understood, these examples do not present a problem for the 'End-Sharing' interpretation. 
However, on many accounts of collective agency a collective agent is individuated by some sort 
of organizing principle, such as a constitution, a set of laws or (in the case of a corporation) its 
articles of association. This means that the limitations I have in mind are not merely 
psychological: there can be cases where a particular agent collective cannot have a particular end 
while  remaining the collective we are considering.   
 
 The ‘Possible Consent’ interpretation seems less problematic than the End-Sharing 
interpreatation. Whatever ends committees, business corporations, and nation states might be 
capable of having, it seems plausible that they can, without self-defeat, consent to people sitting 
on them to fulfill service requirements, promote the welfare of their families and enjoy restful 
vacations. Nevertheless it also seems to face problems. Just as collectives may be formally 
constrained in respect of the ends which they can have, they can also be constrained in respect of 
the sorts of things which they can consent to. Thus, for example, a committee or corporation 
might be constrained by its own rules from consenting to its own dissolution, or from permitting 
women to sit on the board, or from changing the corporation’s name. But it is not clear that 
individual would be acting wrongly in seeking to bring about any of these ends.         
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It is arguable that neither the ‘End-Sharing’ account nor the ‘Possible Consent’ account is 
an entirely satisfactory interpretation of MMP. Notoriously, the first account appears to entail 
that organizing a surprise party for you would involve treating you as a means. Samuel Kerstein 
has argued that on the second account it is not clear that deceptive promise-making involves 
treating the person to whom a promise is made being treated as a mere means. For it seems 
logically possible that someone lending money might do so with the intention of not being paid 
back by the borrower. They might, for example hope to see the person who borrows the money 
have their reputation ruined by making a conspicuous extravagant purchase. xxvii 
    
 Kerstein has recently proposed an interpretation MMP on which incorporates elements 
of both the 'End-Sharing' and 'Possible Consent' interpretations. He calls this the ‘Reinforced 
Hybrid’ interpretation. On this interpretation one agent treats a second agent as a mere means if  
 
1) it is not reasonable for the first agent to believe that the second agent can either 
consent to the first agent’s use of him or share the end he is pursuing in using him 
 
and  2) it is not reasonable for the first agent to believe that what prevents the second agent 
from sharing his end is that the second is using someone else in pursuing an end, and it is  
reasonable for the second agent to believe neither that this person can consent to the 
other’s use of him or share the end that the second person is using him.  
 
Kerstein includes the second clause in order to have an account of treating someone as a 
mere means on which the prohibition on treating someone as a mere means does not rule out 
the possibility of  coercing someone else to prevent them from treating another person as a 
means.xxviii 
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Even if  Kerstein’s account can deal adequately with standard objections to MMP it still 
seems to rule out behavior with respect to collectives which is entirely unobjectionable. Consider 
once again the case of the committee which is formally precluded from seeking its own 
dissolution. It may be both precluded from consenting to this and from having it as an end. On 
Kerstein’s interpretation of MMP, it seems as though trying to bring about the dissolution of the 
committee would involve a contravention of MMP. But it seems implausible that this is in fact 
morally impermissible. 
    
V: The Duty-Respect Argument 
 
One conceivable strategy for arguing that it impermissible to treat collectives as a mere 
means starts from the claim that collectives are capable of seeing themselves as agents which 
have moral duties. If we add to this the idea that little or nothing beyond being able to see 
oneself as an agent who has duties is required for one actually to be an agent who cannot 
permissibly be treated merely as a means to an end, we have an argument that corporations may 
not permissibly be treated merely as a means.  
 
Why might anyone suppose that collectives are capable of seeing themselves as agents 
which have moral duties? There are two possible lines of thought which might support this view. 
First, many philosophers who think that collectives can be agents also think that it makes sense 
to talk of collectives having beliefs.xxix This is sometimes seen as a precondition for collective 
agency, and sometimes argued for as a result of an independent analysis of the notion of 
collective belief.xxx Neither approach seems to entail any obvious constraints on the kinds of 
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beliefs that collectives have. If there are no constraints on the kinds of beliefs that collectives can 
have, then it seems as  though collectives must be capable of seeing themselves as moral agents.  
 
A second line of argument would start, not from the idea of a collective belief, but that 
of a collective emotion. Margaret Gilbert has argued that groups can be the subjects of collective 
emotions, including the emotion of remorse.xxxi It is plausible that an agent that has a capacity for 
remorse must have a capacity to grasp that it is an agent and that it is responsible, morally, for its 
actions. It is also plausible that an agent which can see itself as being morally responsible for its 
actions should see itself as having duties.  
 
If we grant this much, then there might appear to be a viable argument for the claim that 
it is impermissible to treat collectives merely as a means. Consider what I shall call the ‘Duty-
Respect’ claim. 
 
D-R:  An agent that can see itself as having duties should be seen by others as an agent 
which is worthy of moral respect. 
 
If we assume, with Kant that  it is impermissible to treat X merely as a means to an end if 
and only if X is worthy of moral respect, then it follows from the Duty-Respect Claim and what 
has been said before about collectives being capable of seeing themselves as having duties, that it 
is impermissible to treat collectives merely as a means. 
   
VI: Undermining the Duty-Respect Argument 
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This argument should not  convince us that it is  impermissible to treat collectives merely 
as a means?  It fails because  the ‘Duty-Respect Claim’  is false. However, its falsity is easy to 
miss if we restrict our attention to individual human agents. Let me explain. 
 
First, some preliminaries. In what follows, I shall talk, as Kant does, of agents having 
some ends conditionally and others unconditionally. I shall also assume, with Kant, that duties 
are unconditional ends. I shall also assume that if it is impermissible to treat X merely as a means 
to an end, then X can have ends that give rise to duties in other agents, simply because they are 
ends that X has. 
 
One might argue for the  Duty-Respect Claim in one of two ways. First, one might claim 
that an agent that recognizes itself as having duties must also regard itself as deserving of respect; 
and an agent which recognizes itself as worthy of respect must be regarded as worthy of respect 
by others.  
 
 It is certainly plausible that an individual who sees him- or herself as having duties does 
for that very reason have to see him or herself as having ends which are unconditionally valid; or, 
in less Kantian language, as worthy of pursuit independently of any of the agent’s desires. And 
one might think that ends that are worthy of pursuit by an agent independently of that  agent’s 
desires give rise to reasons which ought to have weight for any agent. It would be tempting to 
conclude from this  that an agent which sees itself as having duties  must see itself as deserving 
respect. This conclusion would follow from the claim that there is nothing more to being 
deserving of respect than having ends. However, although this claim is tempting, it is 
nevertheless incorrect.  
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It is incorrect because there is more to the idea of being deserving of respect than having 
ends which give rise to reasons which have weight for all agents.  For an agent A to be deserving 
of respect is for A to have ends which give rise to reasons which have weight for all agents 
because they are A’s ends. It is at least conceivable that a being could have ends which gave rise 
to reasons which had weight for all agents without doing so because they were ends of that 
particular agent. Suppose we thought, as Kant does not, that animals were agents. It might be 
that some animals had ends which gave rise to reasons having weight for all agents not because 
they were the ends of that agent, but because of the value that some other agent placed upon 
those ends. For example, it might be wrong for any agent to wantonly frustrate my pet the ends 
of my pet poodle for food, water and shelter, not because these were ends of the poodle, but 
because the poodle’s flourishing was particularly significant to me, his owner. It would be a 
mistake to say that the poodle was deserving of respect.xxxii   
 
 The tempting claim would be  not only tempting but even correct, if the only agents we 
were considering were individual human agents. After all, we should certainly see  other human 
beings as deserving of respect. But this is not to say that we should see other human beings as 
worthy of respect because they see themselves as being worthy of respect. Indeed there is a good 
reason not to make this latter claim. For it seems to hold out the possibility of giving a moral 
explanation of something for which there is no (further) moral explanation and where the 
demand for a moral explanation is inappropriate. The fact that we should respect other 
individual moral agents is a brute moral fact; not a fact that needs to be explained by reference to 
other facts; and a fortiori not by the fact that they see themselves as being worthy of respect.     
 
 In order to argue successfully that corporations should be seen as ends-in-themselves 
along the lines being considered here, we would need to think that a claim that we have to 
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respect agents which respect themselves could ground or justify a claim that we need to respect 
particular moral agents. I have argued that a claim of the first sort cannot explain a claim of the 
second sort. However, if a claim of the first sort cannot explain a claim of the second sort, it 
cannot justify a claim of the second sort either. Any reason for doubting a claim of the second 
sort would be a reason, and indeed just as good a reason for doubting a claim of the first sort. So 
this  argument does not succeed.  
 
One might instead argue  that an agent which recognizes itself as having duties should be 
regarded as having duties by others; and that an agent which is regarded as having duties by 
others should be regarded as being worthy of moral respect from others. However, even if we 
take it for granted that collectives can have moral duties, the argument fails.  The argument turns 
on whether an agent which is seen as having duties should, for that reason be seen as being 
worthy of respect. When we are considering collective agents, the answer is no. This is because 
of the kinds of duties which collective agents have.  
 
If corporations have duties, they have ends which are unconditional. One might think 
that such unconditional ends would be binding on all moral agents, and that consequently  their 
existence imposed  duties on all  moral agents. Suppose this is right. One might think that this 
meant that corporations were deserving of respect, because for a being to have ends which 
impose duties on all moral agents simply is for that being to deserve respect.  
 
However this is not correct. For a being to deserve respect is for it to have ends which 
impose moral duties on other agents simply because they are the ends of that agent. Corporations have 
no such ends. The unconditional ends that they have – and the duties that they thereby  impose 
on other agents – involve duties that would fall on other agents in any case. So these ends do not 
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impose moral duties on agents simply because they are ends of the corporate agent. So the argument 
being considered does not establish that collective bodies are deserving of moral respect. So it 
does not establish that it is impermissible to treat corporations as mere  means to an end.    
 
VII: Collectives and Their Members 
 
Although the idea that collective agents such as business corporations and nations are 
ends-in-themselves is unattractive, it would seem less objectionable if it could be shown to 
follow from a requirement not to treat individuals as mere means. It might seem obvious that if I 
treat a collective body as a mere means, I must treat some of the individuals who belong to it as a 
mere means. However, I shall argue that this is not correct: treating a collective as a mere means 
need not  involve treating the individuals that make it up as mere means.  
 
Start by considering the ‘end-sharing’ interpretation of MMP. I argued in section III that 
there are many kinds of ends which seem, intuitively, to be perfectly morally acceptable, but 
which certain kinds of collective might be incapable of sharing, simply because of the way in 
which they are constituted. Thus for example, I claimed that it is morally permissible for me to 
apply for a passport with the end of enjoying a restful holiday, while the British state is logically 
precluded from doing so; and its morally permissible for an individual manager to have as their 
end the promotion of the well-being of their employees, even though the corporation may not 
legally have this as their end. If these actions are morally permissible, then it seems as though 
they will not involve treating any individuals as a means. Thus, it seems as though, on the End 
Sharing account I can treat a collective body as a mere  means without treating any individual as 
a mere means. And this seems to be confirmed by further reflection: there does not seem to be 
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anything about either of the ends which I have discussed here which would preclude them from 
being shared by other individuals.     
 
Matters seem more complicated on the Possible Consent account  Recall that on this 
account an agent treats a second agent as a mere means when the first agent has as the maxim of 
their action something to which the second agent could not consent. I shall argue that it does not 
follow from the fact that a collective could not consent to the maxim of some agent’s action that  
individuals who make up the collective could not each consent to it.  
 
In order to defend this claim, I shall  put forward an account of what it is for a collective 
to consent to something which draws on Margaret Gilbert’s work on collective action.xxxiii A key 
notion in Gilbert’s work is that of joint commitment. Roughly speaking a group of individuals 
can be jointly committed to a certain proposition or course of action if they each take it that they 
are committed to it as a body. On such an account a group of individuals could consent, jointly, to 
be treated in a particular way if they agree that they should be treated, collectively in that way.  
 
On Gilbert’s account there can be differences between what individuals are jointly 
committed to and what each of them is individually committed to. In particular, I can take it to 
be acceptable for myself and other members of a group to be treated in a certain way but refrain 
from entering into a joint commitment to allow this. Furthermore, I might find reasons for 
acceding to a joint decision for a group of which I am a member to be treated in a particular way, 
even if I would  not agree to be treated in that way myself. xxxiv 
 
A group of individuals might each individually be convinced that the treatment was 
appropriate, while being unable to express a collective commitment to that view. For example, 
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each individual in the group might take themselves to be morally required - by means of a 
previously given promise - to act in ways which served the interests of the other individual 
members of the collective body. So the collective could be treated in ways to which it was unable 
to consent without any of the individuals in question being unable to consent to being treated in 
this way. In this situation it seems that the collective would be treated as a mere means without 
any individual being treated as a mere means.  
 
Here is a more concrete example. A corporate body might, for formal reasons, be unable 
to consent to its own dissolution. For example, such a possibility is ruled out by its articles of 
association). It would not follow from this fact about the corporation that anyone involved in 
the corporation should be incapable of consenting to its being wound up. (Of course, those who 
stood to profit from the corporation's activities or those who were in leadership roles might be 
unwilling to consent; but they would not be unable to do so.)   
 
Finally we need to consider Kerstein’s ‘Reinforced Hybrid’ account. What we need to 
notice about this is that any behaviour which is ruled out by the first clause of this account must 
be ruled out either by the End-Sharing account or the Possible Consent account. We need to  
find some kind of behavior which falls foul of both the end-sharing and possible consent 
conditions for a corporation, and which involves ends that individuals can both share and 
consent to. We also need a case where the second clause does not come into play.  
 
It seems both that the corporate dissolution case fits these constraints. Notice how it 
satisfies both clauses of the of the first clause: the corporation cannot have as its end its own 
dissolution; nor can it consent to it. What prevents it form doing so is its constitution, not the 
fact that it is treating someone else as a means to an end. So this counts as treating the 
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corporation as a means to an end on Kerstein’s account. But it does not seem to involve treating 
any individual in a way which involves an end which they cannot share, or a maxim which they 
cannot consent to.    
 
VIII: Conclusion 
 
Implausible consequences follow if we accept Kant’s ‘Principle of Humanity’, think that 
it forbids us to treat rational agents as mere means, and are serious about the idea that collectives 
can be rational agents. What conclusions might we draw from this? There seem to be two ways 
we might go. One possibility would be to conclude that we should not be literalists about the 
attribution of agency to collectives. Some Kant scholars - such as Onora O’Neillxxxv -have 
suggested this, talking of corporations and states as being mere ‘secondary agents’; and it may 
have been Kant’s own view. But this seems uncomfortably ad hoc: given that Kant wants to allow 
personhood to individuals in ways that do not depend only on their rational nature and not on 
the details of how that personhood is instantiated, it seems to involve what we might call (by 
analogy with the term ‘speciesism’) an unmotivated kind of ‘individualist chauvinism’.  
 
A second response, which might seem more appealing to those who are not 
independently committed to Kantian positions in moral theory, would be to abandon the 
Principle of Humanity, or at least the ‘Mere Means’ principle. This need not involve saying that it 
is acceptable to treat human beings as mere means. Instead it would involve saying that our duty 
not to do so was grounded in something other than simply our rational nature. This would then 
raise the question of what, other than our minimally rational nature, the relevant feature of 
human beings might be. But that is matter for a future enquiry.xxxvi     
 
Forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly – please cite the published version if it is 
available (there are some small, but non-substantive changes in the final version.) 
19 
Bibliography 
 
Card, C. (2010) Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 
Copp, D. (2006) ‘On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument From ‘‘Normative 
Autonomy’’ ‘. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 pp194–221. 
Dean, R. (2006) Kant’s Formula of Humanity New York, Oxford University Press 
Fagin, M. (2011) ‘Is There Collective Scientific Knowledge: Arguments From Explanation’ 
Philosophical Quarterly 61 pp247-268 
French, P. (1984) Collective and Corporate Responsibility New York,  Columbia University Press 
Frierson, P. (2007) Review of ‘The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory’ Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25272/?id=9364 viewed on 20.02.2013 
Gilbert, M. (1987) ‘Modelling Collective Belief’ Synthese 73 pp185-204 
Gilbert, M. (1989) On Social Facts Routledge, London 
Gilbert, M. (1994) ‘Remarks on Collective Belief’ in Schmitt, F. (ed) Socializing Epistemology: 
The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield. 
Gilbert, M. (2001) ‘Collective Remorse’ in War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing: A Reader ed Jokic, 
A. Blackwell, Oxford UK. 
Glasgow, J. (2007) ‘Kant's Conception of Humanity’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2):291-
308. 
Kant, I. (1785/1992) Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten translated as Grounding for the Metaphysic of 
Morals  (J.Ellington, ed) Indianapolis, Hackett 
Kant, I. (1797/1996) Metaphysik der Sitten translated as The Metaphysic of Morals (M. Gregor, ed.) 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 
Forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly – please cite the published version if it is 
available (there are some small, but non-substantive changes in the final version.) 
20 
Kerstein, S. (2008) ‘Treating Oneself Merely as a Means.’ In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of 
Virtues. Walter De Gruyter. 
Kerstein, S. (2009) ‘Treating Others Merely as Means’ Utilitas 21 (2):163-180. 
Korsgaard, C. (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Kutz, C. (2000) 'Acting Together' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):1-31. 
Lewis, H.D. (1948) ‘Collective Responsibility’ Philosophy 23 3-21 
List, C. And Pettit, P. (2011) Group Agency: The Possibility, Status and Design of Collective Agents  
Miller, D. (2007) National Responsibility and Global Justice Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Nelson, W. (2008) Morgan, S. (2005) ‘The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity’s Radical Evil in 
Kant’s Religion’ Philosophical Review 114 (1) pp63-114 
O’Neill, O. (1989) Constructions of Reason Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 
O’Neill. O. (2001) ‘Agents of Justice’ Metaphilosophy 32 pp180-95 
Pettit, P. (2007) ‘Responsibility Incorporated’   Ethics 117 pp171-201 
Sussman, D. (2005) ‘Perversity of the Heart’ Philosophical Review 114 (2) pp153-177 
Tollefsen, D.(2003) 'Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility' 
Philosophical Explorations 6 (3) 218 – 234.  
Tutkus, B. and Feder, S. Murder, Inc. New York, Manor Books 
Wells, C. (2001) Corporations and Criminal Responsibility Oxford, Oxford University Press  
Wood, A. (2007) Kantian Ethics  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
                                                 
i   Kant 1785/1992 
ii   Dean 2006 pp1-2  
iii   Wood 2007, Nelson 2008 
iv    One might be skeptical as to whether such cases are possible. In Section VII I argue 
that they are.  
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v  As Kerstein 2008 points out, in the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant tells us that ‘the capacity to 
set oneself an end  - any end whatsoever – is what characterizes humanity.’ (Kant 1797/1996). Cf 
Kerstein 2009, p165. Dean 2006 pp 18-9 suggests that ‘the standard view’ among Kant 
commentators - one he contests – is that “ ‘humanity’ refers to some minimal feature or feaures 
of rationality necessarily possessed by any rational agent.’ I discuss Dean’s view in Section IV 
below.  
vi  As Kerstein 2008 also points out. 
vii  See Nelson 2008 for a similar formulation. 
viii    Various kinds of entities have been regarded as collective agents. They include both 
groups with some sort of formal organization such as states, committees, and business 
corporations, and more informal groupings, such as pairs of friends going for a walk. French 
1984, Gilbert 1989, Pettit 2007, Pettit and List 2011. For the bulk of this paper, I shall simply 
assume that at least some ascriptions of agency to collective agents should be understood 
literally, and that when so understood at least some of them are true. Note that  many of  the 
accounts of collective agency  which have been proposed to account for the phenomena of 
collective action are ones on which collectives have the capacity to set themselves ends, as Kant 
requires  
ix  Kutz 2000 is a rare exception. 
x  Tollefsen 2003 
xi  Wells 2001 
xii  Miller 2007 
xiii   Or, as we might say, on the kinds of material in which the formal structures 
characteristic of agency  might be instantiated 'Material' here should be read as contrasting with 
'formal', rather than as a near synoynym for 'physical stuff'.  
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xiv  One might regard this as a reductio ad absurdum of literal ascriptions of agency to collective 
agents. However, this seems untenable. One might also give up on the formula of humanity, or 
on the claim that rationality and humanity are interchangeable terms. However, it is not clear 
how much of a distinctively Kantian approach to ethics could be salvaged without them. 
xv  Card 2010 pp 92-3. 
xvi  For more detail on Murder Inc. see Feder and Tutkus 1951. 
xvii  Card, 2010 ibid. 
xviii  French 1984 
xix  But note the discussion of Richard Dean’s interpretation of the Principle of Humanity in 
Section IV 
xx  Dean 2006 
xxi  Frierson 2007 Glasgow 2007 
xxii  Dean 2006 chapter 5 
xxiii  See Frierson 2007 for an argument that it is not plausibly Kantian  
xxiv   See for example Wood 2007  Korsgaard 1996 
xxv  O’Neill 1989 pp 110-117. Cf Korsgaard 1996 pp137-40 
xxvi  For committees as collective agents, see Copp 2006, List and Pettit 2011 
xxvii  Kerstein 2009 
xxviii I am not sure whether this provision is to the spirit of Kant’s account. However, 
this point does not affect the main point I make here 
xxix  See for example, List and Pettit 2011; 
xxx  Gilbert 1987, 1994. See also Fagin 2011 for a useful account of what a non-reductive 
account of collective belief might amount to  . 
xxxi  Gilbert 2001 
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xxxii  Something similar might be true of collectives, whose claim to agency is, of course,  
being presupposed in this paper. 
xxxiii  Gilbert 1989 
xxxiv  Gilbert 1989  
xxxv  O’Neill 2001 
xxxvi  Acknowledgments (omitted for refereeing) 
